Bin Laden and the Afghan endgame

Javed Burki Saheb’s syndicated column on the meaning of Osama bin Laden’s death stuck me as an important contribution. Burki Saheb has impeccable credentials as an intellectual and public figure and to be well-informed about the “powers that be” in Pakistan, especially from his present vantage point in Lahore. He not only refuses to rule out Pakistani involvement in the Abbottabad operation but suggests that OBL’s death actually suits Islamabad and could have been stage-managed as a well-conceived game plan in order to break the nexus between al-Qaeda and Haqqani network (Pakistan’s favourite proxy in Afghanistan) which in turn can pave the way for a "settlement" in Kabul to the mutual satisfaction of Washington and Islamabad. I’d recommend the article for careful reading.

Killing Osama was the easy part

Prof. Sandy Gordon of Australian National University makes some thoughtful comments on the likely future trajectory of the United States - Pakistan alliance. Arguably, US may suspend its aid programme if it emerges that elements within the Pakistani establishment "knew" of the presence of Osama bin Laden. The issue is as to what degree US wants to or is in a position to queer the pitch or turn on the heat on Pakistan. Gordon sees the US compulsions in terms of the North Waziristan problem and the transit route that Pakistan provides for the NATO forces in Afghanistan. Gordon argues that this US dependence on Pakistan may last for another two years or so and thereafter the relationship is fated to get atrophied.
Gordon makes three other points, namely, that US drawdown in Afghanistan is inexorable in the post-Osama scenario and will be hastened by US' need to prioritise its economy over foreign policy, cut down on military budget and refocus on China. Two, China is not seeking to replace the US as Afghanistan's patron. Three, the emergent AfPak security paradigm hurts Indian interests.
What Gordon fails to factor in are the following elements. Isn't it presumptuous that US will overlook the danger of repeating what it did in 1989 which was to scoot once the Afghan jihad was over and the Soviet Union was done with, and allow the residual forces of militancy to incubate in a near future and regroup under ISI's stewardship through the early 1990s and then come back and hit at the US interests by the second half of that decade? In short, continued US involvement with Pakistan becomes almost unavoidable in the medium term and that would translate as continued US aid to Pakistan so as to leverage Washington's influence on Islamabad. There seems no easy way out of this syndrome.
Second, Gordon overlooks that even assuming that US is resetting its sights on China in its regional policies - and, especially if it is indeed so - Afghanistan and Central Asia can only become even more crucial strategic arena for the "great game". Some Russian comments have actually begun anticipating that US is about to shift gear into an activist mode in Central Asia in the coming months and likely work on effecting "regime change" in the region. Interestingly, last week Barack Obama phoned up Kazakh President Nurusultan Nazarabayev and spoke of the need for democratic reforms in Central Asia.
Over and above, all evidence is that there is no let-up in the US' search for a status of forces agreement with Kabul that formalises long-term US (and NATO) military presence in Afghanistan. In sum, it is premature to estimate that post-Osama, US is getting ready to cut and run from the Central Asian region.
Third, US cannot pursue an effective containment policy toward Iran without a firm foothold in Central Asia. It is logical that the US regional calculus will continue to envisage the "Greater Middle East" as one continuous strategic entity that stretches from the Persian Gulf to Kazakhstan and is supervised under the Central Command. There is hardly any scope to abdicate from Central Asia and still hope to be optimal in "containing" Iran.
Finally, Gordon simply leaves out the upheaval in the Middle East and the huge challenge to the US regional strategies. From the US-Israeli perspective, Egypt is already becoming a "problem child" of the Arab revolution. The challenge assumes criticality if the Arab Spring begins to envelop the Persian Gulf's "pro-West" autocratic regimes. This is where a great need may arise for the US to rope in Pakistan, which is uniquely placed with a big standing army and much surplus manpower and is a major Sunni country. The US is keen to polarise the Persian Gulf along the Sunni-Shi'ite schism while Iran is doing all it can to frustrate that ploy. In short, the cat-and-mouse games of the US-Iran standoff are edging toward a defining moment and Pakistan's role is of great significance for both Washington and Tehran. Besides, the danger of a military conflict involving Iran always exists - and more so with the US public opinion in a jingoistic mood and US desperately coping with the growing isolation of Israel in the Middle East.
Gordon hits the bull's eye insofar as China will keep its head under the parapet and would have no inclination to waste its resources to stabilise Afghanistan. China would rather see US continue to "do the heavy liftng" instead of becoming strategically involved and to concentrate on the lucrative economic spin-off. This is also consistent with the Chinese philosophy of not getting involved in other countries' internal affairs.
Alas, India is placed between the rock and a hard place. Any US appeasement of Pakistan in an Afghanistan settlement can only be at the cost of India's influence in Kabul. Any abrupt US departure from the region leaving matters in such a mess can only pose security challenges of immense proportions for India. India would like to tap into US's capacity to influence on Pakistan, but any big US military aid to Pakistan also hurts Indian interests. All India can hope for is that the nascent dialogue with Pakistan gains traction but then, that's easier said than done.

Osama's end suits Pakistan's ends

The death of Osama bin Laden and the scattering of the al- Qaeda remnants from the region would create a favourable atmosphere for the Afghan peace process to advance. The US and Pakistan can be expected to seek a modus vivendi that accommodates the interests of both sides. The 10-year-old Afghan war is most definitely drawing to a close. Looking beyond, the US would probe how this difficult ally, Pakistan, can be harnessed for the "new great game" beginning in West Asia. Read my article in Mail Today.

US, Pakistan to remain allies

The first detailed White House comments by Press Secretary Jay Carney on the future trajectory of US-Pakistan ties in the aftermath of Osama bin Laden's killing underline Washington's interest to pick up the treads of counterinsurgency cooperation and move on. Carney's remarks will be well-received in Islamabad. Carney made out the following points:
A. US-Pakistan relationship is a complicated one but it is also an important one.
B. On the whole, Pakistanis have been "very helpful in many ways" in the fight against al-Qaeda.
C. Pakistan assisted and helped in the "gathering of intelligence and information" that enabled US to assemble the "mountain of information" that went into the Abbottabad operation.
D. Pakistan remains a "key partner" in the unfinished fight against al-Qaeda.
E. US regards Pakistan as "extremely helpful" and "looks forward to cooperating into the future."
F."Complicated differences" have arisen at times on how the two countries "approach and view things" but at the end of the day there has also been "a great deal of important cooperation" and that shouldn't be lost sight of in arriving at a "complete picture of that relationship".
G. Without doubt, Pakistan has been a "frontline" state in the fight against al-Qaeda and has "suffered in large numbers."
H. Pakistan is a big country with a "big government" and "there are many people in Pakistan and there are many people in the Pakistani government" - implying it isn't a monolithic structure and there are many power centres. Naturally, it isn't a question of "trust" at state-to-state level, but more a "question of the interests we share and the cooperation we've forged".
I. There are indeed differences with certain sections in Pakistan but "you have to be careful about tarring everyone either in the country or the government."
J. US intends to probe how bin Laden could have taken shelter in Pakistan and enjoyed a "support network" or "who, if any" within the Pakistani establishment was aware of the Abbottabad safe house, but it will approach the issue without preconceived notions.
K. US-Pakistan relationship has run into testing times in the past and US has "worked hard" on the relationship since it is an "important and complicated" relationship. US is "confident" that cooperation will continue.
L. Pakistan remains an "essential partner" much as "very divergent opinions" may arise int e relationship.
Most significantly, Carney completely sidestepped the issue of US aid-cut off, as some Congressmen have belligerently demanded. He implied that no such move is in the consideration zone of the US government. The briefing is a signal to Islamabad that once the dust settles down over Osama's killing, there is important business to transact and Washington will approach in a cooperative spirit rather than adversarial. Quite obviously, given the endgame in Afghanistan and the impending draw down of US troops in July, as well as the uncertainties that are arising in the Persian Gulf security (especially with regard to Saudi Arabia), the imperatives of US-Pakistan cooperation remain stronger than ever. It is important to factor in that an estimated 30000 Pakistani personnel provide security for Bahrain, where the US' Fifth Fleet, which is the anchor sheet of US regional strategies in the region, is based. US would factor in the unique status of Pakistan as the Praetorian guards of the Saudi regime if a major crisis arises in the Persian Gulf region.

All great Neptune's ocean can't wash Osama's blood

"This is a sorry sight", said Macbeth in William Shakespeare's play, looking at his bloody hands moments after he murdered King Duncan. His wife thought that's a foolish thing to say, and when she noticed he had brought the bloody daggers from King Duncan's bedchamber, she thought him even more foolish. She told him he must take the daggers back, place them with the King's sleeping grooms, and smear the grooms with blood. Macbeth, however, was so shaken that all he could do was stand and stare at his bloody hands, so Lady Macbeth took the daggers from him. When she went to do the job she thought he should do, Macbeth still stood and stared.
He then asked himself if all the water in the world can wash away the blood: "Will all great Neptune's blood wash this blood / Clean from my hand?" And he answers his own question: "No this my hand will rather / The multitudinous seas incarnadine, / Making the green one red."
The gruesome scene passed through my mind when I read the Telegraph this morning that the White House is backtracking on how Osama bin Laden died. The latest account - not the final account, most certainly - admits that the initial account was riddled with errors. So, the initial claims that the al-Qaeda leader had died while firing an automatic weapon at commandos have been withdrawn, with President Barack Obama’s spokesman admitting “he [Osama] was unarmed”. A dramatic description of bin Laden using his wife as a “human shield” and forcing her to sacrifice her life also proved to be false. The woman was still alive and was taken into custody with several of the terrorist’s children.
In an embarrassing climb-down, Barack Obama’s press secretary, Jay Carney, admitted that the previous version of events — which came mostly from the chief US counter-terrorism adviser, John Brennan — had been put out “with great haste”. The Telegraph says, "The about-turn left the US open to accusations of a cover-up."
To be sure, contradictory versions have begun appearing from Islamabad. The Pakistani authorities now say they had co-operated with the US and had kept the building under surveillance since 2009, which completely rubbishes Obama’s account of a four-year CIA operation to identify bin Laden’s hiding place. The Pakistanis also suggested that their soldiers had raided the building in 2003 — two years before the building was even built, according to the US — looking for another senior al-Qaeda operative.
So, what about the earlier report that Obama and Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state and other senior officials had watched the assault on a live feed provided by a camera mounted on the commando's helmets? The White House is yet to figure out a cogent explanation. Maybe, let us hear the final, authoritative version from Obama himself, duly certified in a sworn affidavit by Clinton who was first witness of the carnage in Abbottabad? The issue isn't as simple as it seems. Navi Pillai, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has already posed the uncomfortable question whether the US operation in Abbottabad was consistent with international law.
Things are indeed becoming murkier and murkier. Osama's blood cannot be easily washed away from the fixtures in the Oval Office. So much calumny has gone into the making of the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Lest we forget, Taliban was prepared to compromise with George W. Bush and hand over Osama for standing trial on 9/11. But, no, Sir, the Texan president wanted a full-fledged invasion of a decrepit country and the massacre of its desperately poor people as a mark of bloody retribution. Obama knows that the national mood still continues to be the same, as the obscene scene of American women and men celebrating in front of White House baying "USA", "USA" amply testified.
However, history is for posterity. The investigative journalist and author Gareth Porter once again reminds us that this entire slice of history since 2001 was completely unnecessary. The chilling facts are: i) Taliban offered to hand over bin Laden in October 2001; ii) Taliban dropped the pre-condition that Americans must come up with evidence of bin Laden's complicity in 9/11; iii) Taliban was desperately seeking a face-saving formula to avoid confrontation with the US, but "Cheney and Rumsfeld were determined not to allow a focus on bin Laden to interfere with their plan for a U.S. invasion of Iraq to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime."
Like Macbeth's predicament, will all the clout over the information order that is at its command, the White House is fumbling, unable to cope with regimentation of the flow of current history. So rapid is its flow and the streams out of Abbottabad are mixing with the rivers of blood flowing out of the Hindu Kush, Mesopotamia and the Libyan deserts. It seems there were 23 children and 9 women in the compound in Abbottabad at the time of the assault. They were apparently "handed over" to the Pakistani authorities. By whom? When? Where? Maybe, we won't know as the dead don't tell tales. But then, the living witnesses can speak, can't they, some day?

Fisk's tribute to bin Laden

The first time Robert Fisk, the iconic British journalist and author (and Arabist), met Osama bin Laden was back in the misty pages of history in 1993. In his magnum opus The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East (shame on you if you haven't yet got hold of that classic), this is how Fisk recalled the setting: "Our journey north from Khartoum lay through a landscape of white desert and ancient, unexplored pyramids, dark, squat Pharaonic tombs smaller than those of Cheops, Chephren and Mycerinus at Giza. Though it was December, a sharp, superheated breeze moved across the desert, and when Kashoggi tired of the air conditioning and opened his window, it snapped at his Arab headdress." Fisk was handpicked by bin Laden for his first-ever interview with a western journalist. Then they met twice again - in Afghanistan.
Fisk's tribute to bin Laden in today's Independent has the poignancy of a passionate chronicler who angrily, incisively and vividly delved into the heart of darkness of radical Islam. He begins by stressing that bin Laden had become more or less a 'spent force': "A middle-aged nonentity, a political failure outstripped by history – by the millions of Arabs demanding freedom and democracy in the Middle East – died in Pakistan yesterday."
And, that takes Fisk to the million dollar question: "Betrayed? Of course he was. By the Pakistan military or the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence? Quite possibly both." In sum, the Pakistani military leadership decided to turn in bin Laden, as the law of diminishing returns is at work any whichever way you look at it.
By the way, do read the edited extract from Fisk's classic which I mentioned above, narrating his second meeting with bin Laden.

China-US diplomatic minuet over Iran

The latest WikiLeaks cables exclusively with Reuters open a window on the complex diplomatic minuet being played out between China and US over Iran sanctions. What comes to relief is the extent to which Washington is going to get China to roll back its energy tie-ups with Iran and the seamless pragmatism on the part of China to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.
It all began in 2009 with the US goading Saudi Arabia to step up its oil exports to China so that China becomes less dependent on imports from Iran. The Saudis were willing to play ball since Riyadh was in any case keen to diversify its exports to the Asian market and China is a famously huge guzzler. The convergence of interests has propelled Saudi Arabia today to emerge as China's number one oil supplier. SA today exports more oil to China than to the US.
But did that discourage China from importing from Iran? No way. It seems China cultivated both Saudi Arabia and Iran as big time suppliers of oil. Make hay while the sun shines, isn't it? The American intention was to somehow goad China into falling in line with the US' push to impose tougher sanctions against the Iranian regime. Did the Americans succeed? Partly, yes. China did become more cooperative than before on the diplomatic front. But behind the curtain, Chinese state oil conglomerates moved into Iran in a big way - ironically, to occupy the areas vacated by the western majors due to the sanctions regime! Wasn't that smart thinking? Earn American goodwill while at the same time expand the business opportunities in Iran! But that is not the end of the story. Instead of reconciling as a passive player, China became a player on its own by taking matters into its own hands and it began performing as a a go-between for Washington with Iran. At one point, Chinese FM Yang Jiechi even assured the US diplomats that rhetoric aside, Iran "deep down" appreciated Barack Obama's willingness to work together.
Meanwhile, Chinese oil companies took care to dodge any punitive American measures by claiming that their projects in Iran were in the nature of service or engineering contracts rather than involving equity stakes or capital investments.
But Washington soon caught on. It mulled over things and came up with a two-pronged strategy - offering sticks and carrots at the same time. The US Congress adopted more stringent laws that could bring within their ambit Chinese energy conglomerates and other foreign firms operating in Iran's energy sector. But simultaneously, US also signalled that as quid pro quo for cooperation, it would allow Chinese energy firms to gain access to the American energy market. Beijing weighed the relative factors of advantage and apparently bit the carrot and asked its big energy firms to go slow in Iran. What induced the Chinese rethink? Well, according to Reuters, "China this year has concluded several major joint ventures to develop shale gas fields in North America as it seeks drilling technology to develop its own reserves of shale gas, the world's largest."