Monday, April 18, 2011
Saudi money wins Obama's mind
Speeches from the Barack Obama administration suggest Saudi Arabia's hint it may extend the largest purchase of American arms in history has worked. In no time at all US Defense Secretary Robert Gates has twisted from urging reform in Gulf states to bowing to Riyadh's role in suppressing revolt and sharing its view that Iran is meddling in the Arab spring. Read my article in Asia Times on the US policy toward the Persian Gulf region.
Friday, April 15, 2011
Money can buy loyalty in Afghanistan
When we come to Iran's policies in Afghanistan, we mostly have a lot of smoke and mirrors. Seldom it is that an 'insider' account appears putting matters in proper perspective. Afghan leader Abdullah Abdullah's narrative, therefore, is of special interest. More so, as according to Abdullah, Iran turned a new page, so to speak, on its Afghan policies at a time when he used to be in the charmed circle of power brokers in Kabul, as the indispensable foreign minister of the New Afghanistan that George W. Bush was creating.
According to Abdullah, Iran began cultivating the government of Hamid Karzai sometime in 2003-2004. To quote Abdullah, “It started in a sort of transparent manner when I was the foreign minister. So it was during [Iranian] President [Mohammed] Khatami’s time, and President Khatami mentioned it to President Karzai, that ‘from my own office, I have a budget at my discretion. If you agree with it, I would like to give some money for your office.’ So it started that way. In the first year, it was twice or three times that this happened — each time, perhaps around $1 million.”
The timing is interesting. Bush had by then called Iran as one of the 'axis of evil' and had forgotten all about the splendid cooperation that Tehran extended for the success of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Mohammad Khatami was still in power in Tehran, albeit on his 'last legs', so to speak, politically bruised and bleeding from the daily ambushes and sniping from within the regime but he still harbored residual hopes that Washington would appreciate him as a man they could do business with. Iran-US standoff was intensifying, too.
As for Karzai, he was Bush's best pal with whom he conferred without fail every single week on phone from Oval Office. Karzai himself was basking in the sunshine of western attention as an acknowledged American puppet and was preparing for the (blatantly rigged) presidential election in 2004 auguring his first term as elected head of state. Everyone seemed to have forgotten about Mullah Omar by that time; Taliban had become, so it seemed, a part of history.
So, Tehran's decision to fund the American puppet in Kabul who was known to have a direct line to the Oval Office showed up a pragmatic policy at its best that almost bordered on cynicism. Tehran would have judged correctly by that time that the language of money spoke best within Karazi's power structure and a few million dollars were worth spending to win friends and influence people. Besides, it was an accepted norm of Afghan political life to accept money as a gesture of goodwill and no moral scruples were being violated.
An interesting thought: Did Tehran anticipate that Karazi would eventually fall out with Washington? Possibly so. Especially since the practice continued even after Khatami was replaced by Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. At any rate, Tehran would have seen the point in discouraging Karzai somehow from aligning in any way with the US policy of 'containment' of Iran.
What is absolutely delightful is that Karzai took American consent before accepting the 'bakshish' from Tehran. Just ponder over it a bit. Bush knew Tehran was cultivating Karzai but okayed it since he had the full confidence that Iranians were wasting their money! How I wish I were a fly on the wall when Karzai and Bush chatted up on the Iranian offer of money!
Karzai, of course, took abundant precaution. He split the Iranian money with his cabinet colleagues - in what proportion we don't know - so that if ever a controversy arose, the entire government would swim or drown with him. Smart thinking! Equally, Bush administration weighed the pros and cons of the Iranian move and seemed to have concluded that the Iranian policies toward Afghanistan could do no great harm and essentially, Iran didn't seek to 'de-stablilize' Afghanistan.
Let me quote the Washington Times report: “We [US] did not take the view that it is in the interest of Iran to destroy Afghanistan and to have massive turmoil and an ungoverned space of the Somalia variety,” said Elliot Abrams, who held various senior National Security Council positions during the George W. Bush administration. “We thought Iran had mixed interests in Afghanistan. And looking back, that seems to be right. It hasn’t acted to create a Somalia there, but it has acted at the very least to undermine American influence and make our presence there, as in Iraq, as difficult and as costly as possible,” Mr. Abrams said.
That is to say, Bush administration saw Iran as a 'stakeholder' in a stable Afghanistan although the American propaganda would have us believe just the opposite. Abdullah didn't reveal how much was his own share of the Iranian money was. What an irony! Abdullah today is America's darling, and he is defaming Karzai. Tomorrow it might be Karzai's turn to allege Abdullah began receiving American money sometime circa 2009. And, if that turns out to be true, that is, if Washington is indeed 'cultivating' Abdullah, can Tehran be far behind? Maybe, Karzai can throw light in a few years' time. To be sure, Americans are playing around dangerously with the Afghan politicians, pitting them against each other and having a good laugh.
According to Abdullah, Iran began cultivating the government of Hamid Karzai sometime in 2003-2004. To quote Abdullah, “It started in a sort of transparent manner when I was the foreign minister. So it was during [Iranian] President [Mohammed] Khatami’s time, and President Khatami mentioned it to President Karzai, that ‘from my own office, I have a budget at my discretion. If you agree with it, I would like to give some money for your office.’ So it started that way. In the first year, it was twice or three times that this happened — each time, perhaps around $1 million.”
The timing is interesting. Bush had by then called Iran as one of the 'axis of evil' and had forgotten all about the splendid cooperation that Tehran extended for the success of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Mohammad Khatami was still in power in Tehran, albeit on his 'last legs', so to speak, politically bruised and bleeding from the daily ambushes and sniping from within the regime but he still harbored residual hopes that Washington would appreciate him as a man they could do business with. Iran-US standoff was intensifying, too.
As for Karzai, he was Bush's best pal with whom he conferred without fail every single week on phone from Oval Office. Karzai himself was basking in the sunshine of western attention as an acknowledged American puppet and was preparing for the (blatantly rigged) presidential election in 2004 auguring his first term as elected head of state. Everyone seemed to have forgotten about Mullah Omar by that time; Taliban had become, so it seemed, a part of history.
So, Tehran's decision to fund the American puppet in Kabul who was known to have a direct line to the Oval Office showed up a pragmatic policy at its best that almost bordered on cynicism. Tehran would have judged correctly by that time that the language of money spoke best within Karazi's power structure and a few million dollars were worth spending to win friends and influence people. Besides, it was an accepted norm of Afghan political life to accept money as a gesture of goodwill and no moral scruples were being violated.
An interesting thought: Did Tehran anticipate that Karazi would eventually fall out with Washington? Possibly so. Especially since the practice continued even after Khatami was replaced by Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. At any rate, Tehran would have seen the point in discouraging Karzai somehow from aligning in any way with the US policy of 'containment' of Iran.
What is absolutely delightful is that Karzai took American consent before accepting the 'bakshish' from Tehran. Just ponder over it a bit. Bush knew Tehran was cultivating Karzai but okayed it since he had the full confidence that Iranians were wasting their money! How I wish I were a fly on the wall when Karzai and Bush chatted up on the Iranian offer of money!
Karzai, of course, took abundant precaution. He split the Iranian money with his cabinet colleagues - in what proportion we don't know - so that if ever a controversy arose, the entire government would swim or drown with him. Smart thinking! Equally, Bush administration weighed the pros and cons of the Iranian move and seemed to have concluded that the Iranian policies toward Afghanistan could do no great harm and essentially, Iran didn't seek to 'de-stablilize' Afghanistan.
Let me quote the Washington Times report: “We [US] did not take the view that it is in the interest of Iran to destroy Afghanistan and to have massive turmoil and an ungoverned space of the Somalia variety,” said Elliot Abrams, who held various senior National Security Council positions during the George W. Bush administration. “We thought Iran had mixed interests in Afghanistan. And looking back, that seems to be right. It hasn’t acted to create a Somalia there, but it has acted at the very least to undermine American influence and make our presence there, as in Iraq, as difficult and as costly as possible,” Mr. Abrams said.
That is to say, Bush administration saw Iran as a 'stakeholder' in a stable Afghanistan although the American propaganda would have us believe just the opposite. Abdullah didn't reveal how much was his own share of the Iranian money was. What an irony! Abdullah today is America's darling, and he is defaming Karzai. Tomorrow it might be Karzai's turn to allege Abdullah began receiving American money sometime circa 2009. And, if that turns out to be true, that is, if Washington is indeed 'cultivating' Abdullah, can Tehran be far behind? Maybe, Karzai can throw light in a few years' time. To be sure, Americans are playing around dangerously with the Afghan politicians, pitting them against each other and having a good laugh.
Monday, April 4, 2011
Pastor Jones and a dreaded ghost
Special United Nations envoy Staffan de Mistura quickly blamed the Taliban for the killing in Mazar-i-Sharif of five Nepalese guards and three UN employees following American pastor Terry Jones overseeing the burning of a holy Koran in the US. De Mistura has missed the plot. The incident is a wake-up call that if pushed too far, non-Pashtuns will take up arms to counter the return of the Taliban to Afghan political structures, and especially in the case of the notorious Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwa, likely to be freed from Guantanamo Bay. Read my article in today's Asia Times....
Sunday, April 3, 2011
Egypt warms up to Iran
A second indicator has appeared that in the downstream of the regime change in Cairo, there are new stirrings in the Egyptian regional policies. The permission granted by the Egyptian authorities, in the face of US and israeli concerns, to the two Iranian warships to cross the Suez Canal, the first-ever since the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, was an act imbued with 'new thinking'. Now comes a far more definitive step by the Egyptian government. Foreign Minister Nabil el-Arabi said on Tuesday (March 29) that Egypt is ready to “open a new page” with Iran. The state-run Middle East News Agency quoted el-Arabi as saying, “The Egyptian government doesn’t consider Iran to be an enemy state. We’re opening a new page with all countries, including Iran.” He offered that restoring full diplomatic ties depends on the Iranian side and added that the two countries have historically-rooted relations.
Tehran has been swift to respond. “Good relationship between the two countries will definitely help stability, security, and development in the region,” Iranian FM Ali Akbar Salehi said in Tehran Saturday. Salehi praised the Egyptian revolution and said, “The Egyptian people by taking steps toward realizing their just demands opened a new chapter in the history of the country and again I congratulate them on this victory.” Salehi added despite ups and downs the “historic relations” between the two countries have always persisted and “I hope in the new environment we witness an upgrade of relationship between the two countries and the two great nations of Iran and Egypt.”
The ties between the two countries were severely damaged following the 1979 Islamic Revolution and literally disintegrated following Egypt’s recognition of Israel later in that same year. Egypt is still the only Arab country that has no embassy in Tehran. A "thaw" in Iran-Egypt relations began tentatively appearing since 2008 when Hosni Mubarak and Mahmoud Ahmedinejad met for the first time and the then Iranian FM Manouchehr Mottaki visited Cairo for official talks. But by end-2008, the two countries clashed over the crisis over israeli blockade of Gaza and Egypt resumed its allegations of Iran-backed hizbollah plots to destabliise the Mubarak regime. By end-2009, however, the "thaw" somewhat resumed. The blow-hot-blow-cold pattern can now be expected to give way to a more predictable relationship.
For Iran, which has excellent relations with Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, to add Egypt to the basket of 'friendly countries' will be a diplomatic coup. It enables Tehran to focus on the GCC states. Egypt is also disengaging from Yemen, which has been a point of discord with Iran. If Egypt-Iran relationship gets normalized, Israel and Saudi Arabia would probably feel disheartened.
Of course, the US policy to 'isolate' Iran regionally by building a containment ring of 'pro-West' regimes was heavily predicated on Mubarak's hostility toward Iran. That policy is no longer sustainable. Egypt is a test case in a broader sense, too. A pattern is emerging: the successor regimes in the Middle East will be much more responsive to public opinion and they may no longer passively acquiesce with the US regional policies.
Tehran has been swift to respond. “Good relationship between the two countries will definitely help stability, security, and development in the region,” Iranian FM Ali Akbar Salehi said in Tehran Saturday. Salehi praised the Egyptian revolution and said, “The Egyptian people by taking steps toward realizing their just demands opened a new chapter in the history of the country and again I congratulate them on this victory.” Salehi added despite ups and downs the “historic relations” between the two countries have always persisted and “I hope in the new environment we witness an upgrade of relationship between the two countries and the two great nations of Iran and Egypt.”
The ties between the two countries were severely damaged following the 1979 Islamic Revolution and literally disintegrated following Egypt’s recognition of Israel later in that same year. Egypt is still the only Arab country that has no embassy in Tehran. A "thaw" in Iran-Egypt relations began tentatively appearing since 2008 when Hosni Mubarak and Mahmoud Ahmedinejad met for the first time and the then Iranian FM Manouchehr Mottaki visited Cairo for official talks. But by end-2008, the two countries clashed over the crisis over israeli blockade of Gaza and Egypt resumed its allegations of Iran-backed hizbollah plots to destabliise the Mubarak regime. By end-2009, however, the "thaw" somewhat resumed. The blow-hot-blow-cold pattern can now be expected to give way to a more predictable relationship.
For Iran, which has excellent relations with Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, to add Egypt to the basket of 'friendly countries' will be a diplomatic coup. It enables Tehran to focus on the GCC states. Egypt is also disengaging from Yemen, which has been a point of discord with Iran. If Egypt-Iran relationship gets normalized, Israel and Saudi Arabia would probably feel disheartened.
Of course, the US policy to 'isolate' Iran regionally by building a containment ring of 'pro-West' regimes was heavily predicated on Mubarak's hostility toward Iran. That policy is no longer sustainable. Egypt is a test case in a broader sense, too. A pattern is emerging: the successor regimes in the Middle East will be much more responsive to public opinion and they may no longer passively acquiesce with the US regional policies.
Friday, April 1, 2011
US compliments Russia's "non-aligned" foreign policy
Howsoever Russia strains to show it is critical of the US-led military intervention in Libya, Americans keep complimenting Moscow for its accommodative attitude. Barack Obama phones up Kremlin, actually, to compliment. A Russian friend wrote to me yesterday that two-thirds of Russian people oppose the western attack on Libya. But Americans know it is often the remaining one-third who call the shots in policy-making, especially in times of war. Voice of America has featured a commentary profusely complimenting Russia for its newfound "non-aligned" foreign policy. Of course, VOA unilaterally defines "non-alignment" as a foreign policy that puts primacy on 'interests' [read trade-offs] rather than high principles or ideology, as it used to be understood in the bipolar world in the last century. VOA explains: "Many analysts see Russia as seeking a post-Imperial role in the world. No longer a superpower, it has decided to try to maintain good relations with key countries around the globe. In Soviet days, Russian diplomats routinely vetoed Security Council resolutions supported by the United States. By abstaining in its UN vote, Russia joined China, Brazil and India. Fyodor Lyukanov edits Russia in Global Affairs magazine. 'Russia does not see itself any more as part of a global power which should participate in everything. Rather, the country focuses interests much more on spheres of most vital interest,' Lyukanov said."
But there is always a tragi-comic twist to such tales. So, VOA concludes: "On Friday, Mikhail Margelov, the Russian government’s top representative to Africa, gave a series of interviews, predicting that Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi would be out of power by June. The Russian official said he was sending aides to Benghazi to forge contacts with the opposition. At the end of the day on Libya, Russian officials may have tried to please everyone, but ended up pleasing no one."
But there is always a tragi-comic twist to such tales. So, VOA concludes: "On Friday, Mikhail Margelov, the Russian government’s top representative to Africa, gave a series of interviews, predicting that Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi would be out of power by June. The Russian official said he was sending aides to Benghazi to forge contacts with the opposition. At the end of the day on Libya, Russian officials may have tried to please everyone, but ended up pleasing no one."
China rallies African opinion on Libya
China utilized the foreign-minister level strategic dialogue with Germany in Beijing on Friday to reiterate its call for a political solution to the Libyan crisis. The visiting German Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle joined Chinese FM Yang Jiechi to say, "The Libyan situation cannot be resolved by military means. There can only be a political resolution and we must get the political process underway."
"Both China and Germany abstained from voting for UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which shows that the two states have reservations on the resolution," Yang told reporters. The resolution was adopted to stop violence and protect civilians, Yang said, adding that China is worried by continued reports of deaths and injuries among civilians and the escalation of military conflict in Libya. China maintained that concerned countries should strictly abide by the resolution and respect Libya's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity, Yang said. "The matter should be addressed appropriately by political and diplomatic means," he added.
China has scored a big point on the diplomatic front by getting Germany to take a common position with it. This comes barely two days after Hu Jintao's plain-speaking with the visiting French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Quite obviously, Beijing has taken the high ground in the Libyan crisis and has positioned itself visibly as the flag carrier of opposition to the western military intervention. Interestingly, it is acting entirely on its own.
Xinhua carried a strident commentary today posing the rhetorical question: "Why Libya, why not Cote d'Ivoire or Somalia? It's a question posed in Africa - from Cape Town to Addis Ababa, from Nairobi to Abuja. Though reasonable, the question has not yet been highly valued or clearly responded... The U.N.-sanctioned military operation is based on an assumption: Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi will massacre all the residents after storming the rebel's eastern stronghold of Benghazi. Thus, the crisis is latent and the operation is preventive. Also in Africa, on the western side, a humanitarian crisis looms in Cote d'Ivore. That's where hundreds of thousands of people have fled their homes and nearly 500 have been killed by forces loyal to President Laurent Gbagbo, who clings to power despite losing to Alassane Ouattara in the Nov. 28 presidential run-off election. Why Libya but not Cote d'Ivoire?"
The commentary quotes prominent African leaders echoing China's criticism of the western intervention. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni accused Western countries of using double standards by pushing for a no-fly zone and asked: "Why Libya, but not Bahrain or Somalia? While imposing a no-fly zone in a rival country like Libya, the West turns a blind eye to a similar case in Bahrain, one of the pro-West countries. We have been appealing to the U.N. to impose a no-fly zone over Somalia so as to impede the free movement of terrorists, without success. Why? Are there no human beings in Somalia similar to the ones in Benghazi? Or is it because Somalia does not have oil which is not fully controlled by the western oil companies?"
The commentary concludes by rallying African opinion against the West. "In the world arena, the Africa countries have often been regarded as a 'silent majority'. In fact, Africa may not be really silent. Instead, maybe its voice has not been valued or considered. As the war in Libya faces a deadlock and turbulence in the Middle East appears to be sprawling to Africa, questions concerning Africa's situation require rational settlement, rather than any unwise approach."
The way things are developing, the longer the western military operations in Libya continue, the greater will be the opportunity for China to rally African opinion. The decision by the African Union not to participate in the London conference last Tuesday creates a highly favorable backdrop for China's diplomatic offensive in Africa. The West has no answer to China's campaign.
"Both China and Germany abstained from voting for UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which shows that the two states have reservations on the resolution," Yang told reporters. The resolution was adopted to stop violence and protect civilians, Yang said, adding that China is worried by continued reports of deaths and injuries among civilians and the escalation of military conflict in Libya. China maintained that concerned countries should strictly abide by the resolution and respect Libya's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity, Yang said. "The matter should be addressed appropriately by political and diplomatic means," he added.
China has scored a big point on the diplomatic front by getting Germany to take a common position with it. This comes barely two days after Hu Jintao's plain-speaking with the visiting French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Quite obviously, Beijing has taken the high ground in the Libyan crisis and has positioned itself visibly as the flag carrier of opposition to the western military intervention. Interestingly, it is acting entirely on its own.
Xinhua carried a strident commentary today posing the rhetorical question: "Why Libya, why not Cote d'Ivoire or Somalia? It's a question posed in Africa - from Cape Town to Addis Ababa, from Nairobi to Abuja. Though reasonable, the question has not yet been highly valued or clearly responded... The U.N.-sanctioned military operation is based on an assumption: Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi will massacre all the residents after storming the rebel's eastern stronghold of Benghazi. Thus, the crisis is latent and the operation is preventive. Also in Africa, on the western side, a humanitarian crisis looms in Cote d'Ivore. That's where hundreds of thousands of people have fled their homes and nearly 500 have been killed by forces loyal to President Laurent Gbagbo, who clings to power despite losing to Alassane Ouattara in the Nov. 28 presidential run-off election. Why Libya but not Cote d'Ivoire?"
The commentary quotes prominent African leaders echoing China's criticism of the western intervention. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni accused Western countries of using double standards by pushing for a no-fly zone and asked: "Why Libya, but not Bahrain or Somalia? While imposing a no-fly zone in a rival country like Libya, the West turns a blind eye to a similar case in Bahrain, one of the pro-West countries. We have been appealing to the U.N. to impose a no-fly zone over Somalia so as to impede the free movement of terrorists, without success. Why? Are there no human beings in Somalia similar to the ones in Benghazi? Or is it because Somalia does not have oil which is not fully controlled by the western oil companies?"
The commentary concludes by rallying African opinion against the West. "In the world arena, the Africa countries have often been regarded as a 'silent majority'. In fact, Africa may not be really silent. Instead, maybe its voice has not been valued or considered. As the war in Libya faces a deadlock and turbulence in the Middle East appears to be sprawling to Africa, questions concerning Africa's situation require rational settlement, rather than any unwise approach."
The way things are developing, the longer the western military operations in Libya continue, the greater will be the opportunity for China to rally African opinion. The decision by the African Union not to participate in the London conference last Tuesday creates a highly favorable backdrop for China's diplomatic offensive in Africa. The West has no answer to China's campaign.
Neo-Ottomans discover new Middle East
Turkey is convinced it stands as a shining example of democracy for Muslim nations, but it is far from becoming a shepherd for a new Middle East where historical divides are being accentuated as America's influence wanes. Sunni Arab co-religionists resent the Ottoman era, and Tehran is unlikely to welcome the diplomats from Ankara now wading into Shi'ite Iran's backyard. My article on the thrust of Turkish policies in response to the 'Arab revolt' appeared in today's Asia Times.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)